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Learning to be affected: social suffering and 
total pain at life’s borders
Yasmin Gunaratnam
Abstract: The practice of ‘live sociology’ in situations of pain and suffering is the 
focus of this article. An outline of the challenges of understanding pain is followed 
by a discussion of Bourdieu’s ‘social suffering’ (1999) and the palliative care philoso-
phy of ‘total pain’. Using examples from qualitative research on disadvantaged dying 
migrants in the UK, attention is given to the methods that are improvised by dying 
people and care practitioners in attempts to bridge intersubjective divides, where the 
causes and routes of pain can be ontologically and temporally indeterminate and/or 
withdrawn. The paper contends that these latter phenomena are the incitement for 
the inventive bridging and performative work of care and live sociological methods, 
both of which are concerned with opposing suffering. Drawing from the ontology of 
total pain, I highlight the importance of (1) an engagement with a range of materials 
out of which attempts at intersubjective bridging can be produced, and which exceed 
the social, the material, and the temporally linear; and (2) an empirical sensibility that 
is hospitable to the inaccessible and non-relational.
Keywords: death, interdisciplinarity, migrants, ontology, palliative care
My ‘live sociology’ takes its vital inspiration from death.
For the past 15 years or so, pushed and pulled by biographical events, I have 
been researching migrants, illness, death and dying.1 There is an existential and 
carnal density to this world of life at its limits that makes tangible a central 
sociological problematic – that of intersubjective communication and under-
standing. In Les Back’s preliminary sketching of ‘live sociology’, understanding 
the experiences of others is an abiding methodological concern and one which 
carries an ethical charge: sociologists have a responsibility to seek out and bring 
to publicity ‘the fragments, the voices and stories that are otherwise passed over 
or ignored’ (2007: 1). Here, through a discussion of pain and disadvantaged 
dying migrants, I show how following idiosyncratic fragments and the fleeting 
can bring us not only to the larger and longer lasting, but also to the recessive, 
indeterminate and discontinuous qualities of life.
What is sociologically interesting and distinctive about transnational dying 
is that it is a situation constituted by two radical and simultaneous registers and 
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thresholds of estrangement: the spatio-temporal and the phenomenological. 
There is a dramatic ethico-political significance to such borders Derrida (1993: 
3) tells us, making explicit the edges of belonging, language and territorializa-
tion and where ‘borders of property’ are not only grounded but also carry a 
metaphysical resonance connoting ‘the right of property to our own life’ (1993: 
5). The idea of life as ‘property’ is a complicated one, evoking life as a province 
– a territory that is as much temporal as it is spatial – marked by borders to the 
unknown,2 rendering it discontinuous and choppy, never at one with itself. And 
because all human life is characterized by thresholds and ‘a common ontological 
condition as vulnerable’ (Turner, 2006: 9) there are wider inferences to be made 
from the worlds of dislocated dying. Despite the ever-increasing contests over 
territorial boundaries, as Dikeç et al. remind us ‘what is also always with us are 
the borders, thresholds, and turning points of ordinary, embodied existence. 
And these are no less significant than the more concrete figures of mobility and 
transition’ (2009: 11).
Here, through a focus on pain, I will explicate something of what I have 
learned about methodology and ontology from the improvisations of dying 
migrants and care professionals at life’s thresholds. There are two main things 
that I want to do. First, I suggest the value of multiple and interconnected 
analytic registers by bringing into conversation sociological accounts of ‘social 
suffering’ (Bourdieu, 1999) with what in palliative care is called ‘total pain’. 
Total pain interpolates, and at times creolizes, physical, social, psychological 
and spiritual pain (Saunders, 1964). It also gives recognition to pain that is 
accrued over a lifetime.
Total pain is a multimodal method of auscultation and care as much as it is 
a philosophy. It seeks to invent and legitimize ways of reading and becoming 
receptive to multifarious situations as pain. In this regard, it is a performative 
method and care practice that both describes and helps to bring to symboliza-
tion the phenomena it tries to apprehend and get close to. A distinctive value 
of the inventiveness of total pain is how it provides for the assembling of hetero-
geneous phenomena within the domains of pain. However, unlike a flat ontol-
ogy (DeLanda, 2002), it avoids a ‘smear of equivalence’ between entities 
(Lorimer, 2005: 88) by not presupposing that phenomena have an analogous 
status and by allowing for that which is ontologically and temporally insecure 
and/or withdrawn. The latter entities are not fully accessible in the here and 
now. They can lack a referent and/or inherent, stable qualities (see also Barad, 
2007). I will argue that it is the excessive haunting of the withdrawn that incites 
the experimental bridging work of care, where improvised attempts to alleviate 
suffering cannot always rely upon an evidence base in sensual knowledge. In 
this regard, responsibility for – and accountability to – what is withdrawn con-
stitutes a space of ethics (Levinas, 1994). And sometimes of politics.
Second, and relatedly, I examine the effects of these complex interfaces 
between entities and the work that they inspire, in relation to my knowledge 
exchange practices and the movements between circuits of ‘learning to be 
affected’ (Latour, 2004) by a diversity of realities and perspectives, and being 
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affected and provoked to learn. This is an interdisciplinarity where the limita-
tions of existing knowledge can produce transformations in a given ‘logic of 
ontology’ of pain (Barry et al., 2008). But more of this later. Let me first con-
textualize some more by describing the challenges of accounting for painful 
experiences.
Pain
Physical pain does not simply resist language but destroys it, bringing about an 
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human 
being makes before language is learned. (Scarry, 1987: 4)
At the heart of attempts to apprehend human pain and suffering is an implicit 
falling short of methodology and analysis (Bourdieu, 1999; Harrison, 2007). 
These experiential states, however loud and flailing, are deemed to mark a 
certain aporetic; a detachment and retreat from word and world. As Harrison 
puts it ‘experiences of suffering are quasicontradictory experiences in that they 
tend towards the limits of experience, towards the unexperienceable and irrecu-
perable’ (2007: 595). This falling back of the self into a depth of experiencing 
disturbs long-standing philosophical injunctions from Descartes’ cogito to 
Nietzschian vitalism. It is also problematic for Anglophone interpretative social 
science and the pervading legacy of Verstehende approaches where a defining 
claim is that ‘subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociologi-
cal knowledge’ (Weber, 1947: 104).
Yet even in the most radical accounts of pain as a destroyer of language, 
recognition is given to the role of pain translation and advocacy and to those 
such as physicians, where the success of the medical practitioner is dependent 
upon ‘the acuity with which he or she can hear the fragmentary language of 
pain, coax it into clarity, and interpret it’ (Scarry, 1987: 6). The role of pain 
translation and advocacy also exists in the social sciences where the demands 
that pain, trauma, vulnerability and suffering make upon social analysis have 
been given sustained attention (Bar-On, 1999; Harrison, 2007; Frost and 
Hoggett, 2008; Waddell, 1989; Warin and Dennis, 2008).
What characterizes these social science discussions is the recognition that 
pain and distress can be produced by the social: by inequality, marginalization, 
injustice, powerlessness and persecution. It is perhaps not surprising that such 
forms of suffering can manifest at the end of life for socially disadvantaged 
migrants, where lives are looked back on, regret and losses can (re)surface, and 
selves and bodies can become both more salient and more vulnerable as illness 
progresses and also at different stages of the care pathway that involve varying 
degrees and rhythms of exposure (Gunaratnam, 2008b). In a Swedish study, 
nurses reported that caring for refugees and for survivors of the Nazi concentra-
tion camps often demanded greater attention to the routines and technical 
procedures of bodily care. One nurse described how ‘we had a patient who had 
been in a concentration camp  .  .  .  it was awful of course  .  .  .  talking about 
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gas  .  .  .  she had great difficulty in breathing and it was extremely hard and there 
were so many memories involved in it all  .  .  .’ (Ekblad et al., 2000: 628).
I have also found that at diagnosis, particularly if it is perceived to be prob-
lematic, commonly expressed questions of ‘why?’ (Saunders, 2006) and ‘why 
me?’ (Stanworth, 2004) can, for dying migrants, take on a twist of ‘is it me?’ A 
story recounted in a focus group interview by Mita, a Cancer Nurse Specialist, 
speaks of how the felt injustices of diagnostic care can resonate with the injuries 
of racism, producing a layered distress. Mita’s story concerned an Indian Hindu 
patient with terminal cancer. The man’s cancer had been repeatedly misdiag-
nosed leaving him feeling angry and distressed. The patient had been a teacher 
in India and on settlement in the UK could not get a teaching job, and so had 
worked in factories and as a bus driver. In Mita’s words:
I think it (his feelings of being excluded from professional employment) had an impact 
on how he dealt with his condition, because unfortunately his diagnosis had been 
quite delayed. For a year he’d been going backwards and forwards to the GP, telling 
him all the classic symptoms of what he’d got  .  .  .  he still had this idea and he said ‘I 
know I’m educated and I know I’m completely in the wrong box. I think they haven’t 
treated me properly because I am who I am, because saying I was only good enough 
for bus driving, not for teaching and for the same reason they didn’t think I was 
important enough to be diagnosed early enough to be treated in the right way.’ And 
I found that very hard. That was really difficult, that was hard for me to take. I mean 
what can you say?  .  .  .  What can I actually say to him that’s actually going to make 
a difference to him? And I found that really difficult. (Gunaratnam, 2008a: 35)
For Mita, the intractable problem is how to respond to and alleviate the 
patient’s anguish at the multiple injustices he feels. In the study The Weight of 
the World (1999), first published in French in 1993, Pierre Bourdieu uses the 
term ‘social suffering’ to recognize such experiences and to examine the relation-
ships between la grande misère (material inequality) and la petite misère or the 
‘ordinary suffering’ of living with inequality and injustice. The Weight of the 
World combines ethnographic and interview methods to produce a series of pen 
portraits of ordinary suffering across and within different social strata. In the 
study there is a continuous overlapping between the social, the somatic and the 
‘spiritual’ as Bourdieu calls it.
The weight of the world
Because of the difficulties in expressing social suffering, sociological attentive-
ness to it has to be cultivated Bourdieu argues, through ‘active and methodo-
logical listening’ (1999: 609). In the project, interviewers often had a long-standing 
connection to, and embodied familiarity with the research sites and the partici-
pants, a practice developed by the research team to reduce social asymmetries 
and the risks of symbolic violence. In some respects and despite claims to the 
contrary, the methodological disposition that Bourdieu and his collaborators 
sought to develop – ‘to situate oneself in the place the interviewees occupy in 
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the social space in order to understand them as necessarily what they are  .  .  .’ 
(1999: 613, author’s emphasis) – appears close to an affective empathetic version 
of Weber’s Verstehen. However, for Bourdieu, the aim was to confect an 
extraordinary attentiveness and proximity in the interviews in order to cut 
through the ‘we’ve already seen and heard it all’ (1999: 614) cynicism of the 
researcher, and to reach a practical understanding of how social structures and 
histories can be felt in each research participant’s ‘idiosyncrasy’.
Angela McRobbie (2002) has criticized Bourdieu’s study for its sentimental-
ity, lack of thick description and methodological rigour. The careful document-
ing and exposition of the negotiation between subjectivity and objectivity and 
theoretical and practical knowledge that usually characterize Bourdieu’s empiri-
cal research, although present, are certainly more muted in this project. Instead, 
the pain translation and advocacy role of the sociologist is emphasized and situ-
ated in her ability to give time, space and self to the interviewee and ‘like a 
mid-wife’ (1999: 621) to bring deep buried suffering and discontent into the 
world of expression and understanding. This is not the ‘communication as com-
munion’ (Shields, 1996: 276) model of Verstehen that Rob Shields has critiqued 
so vigorously. ‘Against the old distinction made by Wilhem Dilthey’, Bourdieu 
contends ‘we must posit that understanding and explaining are one’ (Bourdieu, 
1999: 613, author’s emphasis). In such qualifications and differentiations, 
Bourdieu appears acutely aware of the normative and controversial nature of 
his empirical approach to suffering:
at the risk of shocking both the rigorous methodologist and the inspired hermeneutic 
scholar, I would say that the interview can be considered a sort of spiritual exercise 
that  .  .  .  aims at a true conversion of the way we look at other people in the ordinary 
circumstances of life. The welcoming disposition, which leads one to make the respon-
dent’s problems one’s own, the capacity to take that person and understand them just 
as they are in their distinctive necessity, is a sort of intellectual love  .  .  .  (1999: 614, 
emphasis in original)
The words ‘spiritual’3 and ‘love’ emphasized so provocatively by Bourdieu point 
to the limits of the ‘scientific intent’ (1999: 621) of social research. In its place 
Bourdieu institutes sociology as a ‘craft’, entailing improvisation and intersub-
jective and intercorporeal bridging work between the interviewer and research 
participant ‘so as to help respondents deliver up their truth, or, rather, to be 
delivered of it’ (1999: 621).
Social suffering and the more-than-social
Mindful of McRobbie’s critique of The Weight of the World, I am interested in 
what Bourdieu and his colleagues were trying to get at with their flagrant, if 
ambivalent, detours outside of methodological orthodoxy and into the more-
than-social. In many respects their stubborn allegiance to the specific social 
constitution of suffering is very much in evidence throughout the project, ensur-
ing that ‘ordinary suffering’ remains within sociological reach: it can be com-
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prehended, thematized and explained empirically. But there is also a more 
intermittent acknowledgement of how attention to the ‘idiosyncrasy’ of suffer-
ing can necessitate a move outside of disciplinary traditions, so that analysis 
and methodology overflow into such matters as spirit and love that breach and 
offend scientific enterprise, categories and language. In this respect, and taking 
into account the long history of forensic attention to methodological practice 
that marks Bourdieu’s research, there seems to be something more profound 
and artful going on than the ‘sociological opportunism’ that Angela McRobbie 
has read into the researchers’ empirical rule-breaking (2002: 134). In the context 
of my research experiences, I want to suggest that Bourdieu’s forays into the 
more-than-social can be read as a contact with the vitality and anti-thematizing 
qualities of suffering and the impossibility of limiting the affects and effects of 
the painful to one sphere of life and being.
The unruliness of pain, and the coincidence of the thresholds of the geo-social 
and the phenomenological, can be found in the situation of Ibrahim, a 46-year-
old Ghanaian refugee with kidney cancer. Ibrahim had migrated to the UK in 
the 1980s as a part of a cohort of Ghanaians escaping political persecution. I 
interviewed him in his hospice bed, ten days before he died. Ibrahim’s physical 
pain percolated into the form and content of our interview. He alternated 
between sitting up and lying down to relieve his pain. Spasms of pain were per-
ceptible in his intonation and in the recuperative pauses and breaths that he 
took when speaking, leaving the transcript punctured by ellipses. My concerns 
about Ibrahim meant that I ended the interview prematurely and we made plans 
to resume our conversation a couple of days later. By that time Ibrahim was 
slipping into unconsciousness and I did not talk to him again.
The one interview that I had with Ibrahim was taken up by stories of his 
illness, diagnosis, and migration to the UK: ‘I knew if I didn’t move out of the 
country I would either lose my, my peace or my life altogether’. He talked at 
length about his economic concerns: the financial future of his partner and 16-
month-old baby in the UK, and how his extended family and two children in 
Ghana would survive without his regular remittances. Ibrahim worried aloud 
about the cultural identity of his baby son. At the time when we met, hospice 
doctors were overhauling Ibrahim’s drugs to better control his pain and hospice 
social workers had secured a small grant to ease the family’s financial burdens. 
Ibrahim had come up with his own solution to the problem he saw facing his 
baby. He wanted to be buried in Ghana:
I want my son to (.  .  .) one day not just melt away into this society, but think 
of a place where he comes from and one day, or once in a while go back there, and 
when he goes there and then there’s this grave stone standing there and say ‘Oh that’s 
your Dad lying down there’ just gives him some kind of attachment to a place which 
I will cherish (.  .  .) yeah, but if he stays here, just melts away into society and that’s 
the end (.  .  .).
The constituency of Ibrahim’s situation and the materials that he talked of 
using to bridge the thresholds of life and death, and here and there, bring into 
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view the affective, physical and metaphysical dimensions of the geo-social. We 
can understand something of Ibrahim’s improvisations socially with regard to 
his citizenship status, cultural and masculinist concerns of inheritance, wider 
transnational networks and repatriation death rituals amongst Ghanaian 
migrants (see Krause, 2008). All of these phenomena provide insight into the 
movements of material and semiotic resources in Ibrahim’s life. Nevertheless, 
to reduce these diverse matters to the social would be to abolish the many novel 
coordinates of Ibrahim’s predicament. In a Northern European context, Ibra-
him’s desire for a post-death connection with his son is an anti-rational tempo-
rization, which, following Lisa Adkins (2009a), we might call ‘event time’. For 
Adkins, event time marks a departure from the normative dominance of 
mechanical clock time that characterized industrial capitalism. In contrast, 
event time signifies a temporality that ‘no longer stands outside phenomena 
.  .  .  but unfolds with phenomena’ (Adkins, 2009b: 336, original emphasis). Event 
time is thought to be a product of contemporary transformations in the social 
field from a territory to a contingent circulation.
The problem of how to ensure a child known in the present connects with a 
country he may have no experience of in the future, and where in the past his 
father was endangered, is a new affective and spatio-temporal drama and source 
of distress for Ibrahim. It is a predicament where questions of territory and 
circulation are coincident in the production of time. In these complicated cir-
cumstances, the attempt to forge an attachment, or to perhaps make a claim 
upon his son’s future identity, is made by casting a lifeline4 from a speech act 
requiring social (understanding of intention) and material (repatriation, burial, 
Ghanaian soil) uptake.
In this ethnographic study, I was able to follow what happened to Ibrahim 
after his death: his family in the UK could not afford to bury him in Ghana. 
The social a priori in such circumstance is imposing and seemingly determining, 
inhibiting the actualization of Ibrahim’s desire for a post-mortem agency, and 
pointing to the force of broader socio-economic patterns. Valuable as ethno-
graphic methods are in following the movement of practices and affects (Mol, 
2006), they have their limits in tracking the contingencies, non-linearities and 
metaphysics of uptake and actualization; the ways in which Ibrahim’s desire for 
a lifeline to his son might end with his burial in the UK, or might yet unfurl 
through unpredictable, and for me unknowable and untraceable, future 
events.
If Ibrahim’s story brings into view the multiple layers of the geo-social, it 
also pushes attentiveness to improvisation outside of the social – to such matters 
as flesh, soil and spirit, and to the weird temporalities and idiosyncrasies of 
event time. However, Ibrahim’s bridging work is more of a once-in-a-life-time 
method (a technique) than a developing methodology (a systematic theoretical 
and philosophical framework). It is in the work of care practitioners, who are 
involved in the daily work of attempting to bridge intersubjective divides that 
I have been able to better understand the value of the ontology of total pain 
and how it is relevant to the practising of live sociology.
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Total pain: ‘all of me is wrong’
I remember one patient who said, when asked to describe her pain: ‘Well, doctor, it 
began in my back but now it seems that all of me is wrong,’ and she then described 
her other symptoms. She went on  .  .  .  ‘I could have cried for the pills and injections 
but knew that I must not. My husband and son were wonderful but they were having 
to stay off work and lose their money.’ She was suffering a ‘total pain’.  .  .  .  It is, in a 
way, somewhat artificial thus to divide a whole experience but it may give an internal 
checklist on meeting a new patient. (Saunders, 1988: 171–172)
The biopsychosocial challenges of alleviating the chronic pain that characterizes 
terminal disease preoccupied Cicely Saunders, a philosophy student, turned 
nurse, social worker and then physician.5 Saunders collected over 1,000 patient 
narratives, and used them, together with patient drawings, writing and poetry, 
to develop her ideas on end-of-life care and total pain. Saunders approached 
chronic pain as a ‘situation’ rather than an event (Saunders, 1970), requiring 
practitioners to be ‘attentive to the body, to the family and to [the] patient’s 
inner life’ (2006: 217).
Taking her inspiration from patient narratives, Saunders argued that the 
constituency and temporality of pain had to be approached as a complex het-
erogeneity that included not only the physiological but also the social, economic 
and existential, so that focus shifted from the genre of disease, and from bio-
chemistry and drugs, to treating the many symptoms of a terminal condition. 
In the domains of total pain, the plural constituents of pain are allowed a mys-
terious ecology, sometimes intra-relating and sometimes distinguishable, both 
substantial and withdrawn, requiring multidisciplinary, but also inventive care. 
And whilst recognition of total pain does not by itself ensure effective pain relief, 
the effort of trying to understand an-other’s needs for care, even when one fails, 
remained practically and ethically significant for the content and quality of care 
practices (see also Mol, 2008).
In similar ways to Bourdieu’s The Weight of the World, Saunders’ work with 
pain often strayed into matters of the immaterial and unquantifiable: ‘The spirit 
is more than the body which contains it’ (Saunders, 1961: 396). Unlike Bourdieu, 
Cicely Saunders’ work with death entailed recognizing irredeemable loss and 
the limitations of the bridging work of care in responding to different integrities, 
genealogies, temporalities and scales of pain. For every success story in Saun-
ders’ writing – a patient whose emotional pain is relieved by the right choice 
and dose of a tranquillizer – there is also often a reminder that some forms of 
pain cannot be explained or eased, so that in the case of emotional distress she 
writes ‘a good deal of suffering has to be lived through’ (2006: 219). The role 
of the care practitioner in such circumstances is marked by a quintessential 
passivity, and where attentiveness is not necessarily a bridge to the other ‘We 
are not there to take away or explain, or even to understand but simply to 
“Watch with me”.  .  .’ (Saunders, 2006: 219). Here, responsiveness to pain and 
to its enigmas transfigures into a non-acting serving and standing-by of others 
(Waddell, 1989).
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In working between the quantitative empiricism of medicine – observing, 
measuring, indexing, calculating, trialling – and what Alain Badiou (2002) 
would call a fidelity to the unknown, Saunders’ work questions disciplinary 
boundaries. It also reinstates care as a part of human adventuring (see Greco, 
2009) requiring technical skills and expertise and ‘negative capability’. ‘Negative 
capability’ is the term that the poet Keats (1958 [1817]) has used to denote the 
capacity to tolerate incomplete understanding and mystery. Whilst not forget-
ting that the ‘total’ of total pain raises matters of a non-innocent inscription 
and expanded surveillance (Clark, 1999), its domains and claims are not as 
totalizing as its nomenclature suggests. Rather than signifying a closed system, 
total pain seems to point to the infinite, acknowledging that even with its open-
ness to diverse registers of pain, painful entities can elude understanding and 
control. In this non-relational ontology, recognition of the puncta produced by 
the cryptic and withdrawn qualities of painful things suggest that phenomena 
can always be more (or less) than the sum of their relations.
It is difficult to find concise examples from my research that demonstrate 
total pain as an inventive care practice, but an event that comes close, was 
described by a community-based nurse Rachel (see Gunaratnam, 2008b). 
Shortly before I interviewed Rachel, she had spent most of the afternoon on 
the telephone trying to find a specialist pressure-relieving mattress for a double 
bed (they are most commonly available to the National Health Service for single 
beds). The mattress was for a couple, originally from Jamaica. The husband, in 
his mid-seventies, had prostate cancer that had spread throughout his body and 
was unable to sleep at night because of a cough. In Rachel’s opinion ‘The cough 
is his way of trying to keep himself awake because he’s afraid he’ll die in his 
sleep.’ The couple were finding it difficult to talk to each other and to profes-
sionals about the progressing cancer and the husband’s impending death. In the 
interview Rachel told me:
My staff nurse had seen him first and had ordered a highfaluting pressure mattress. 
So I went to see them and said ‘My colleague has ordered this for you, where do you 
normally sleep?’ And the wife said ‘Well, we’ve slept in the same bed for 43 years’. 
And I said ‘Well how will you manage if we put your husband in a single bed?’ ‘Oh 
I’ll sleep in a camp bed next to him.’ I said ‘Well at the moment things seem to be 
OK. If I get a double mattress would that be more preferable?’ And that was what 
she wanted and that’s what we’ve done. I think we will probably need to get a hospital 
bed and a super-duper mattress another two weeks down the line, but we’ve given 
them another 3 or 4 weeks of sleeping next to each other in bed, which I think is 
much more important for the moment while they build up their trust of us and cope 
with the loss of each other.
The three to four extra weeks of sleeping together that Rachel’s act of poetic 
realism brought to this couple are significant both with regard to the increased 
valuing and pertinence of mechanical clock time for those who are dying, and 
in relation to an event time of togetherness that is unquantifiable. In the ontol-
ogy of total pain the qualities of the mattress can be thought of as a psychic 
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and material bridge and a substrate that can continue to connect and support 
the couple in Rachel’s absence. As an affective underpinning, the significance 
of the mattress and its potential to relieve suffering is indivisible from its mate-
riality; the extent to which its form and sensual qualities are themselves ‘actants’ 
in the Latourian sense, impressed by two variously suffering bodies, a cough, 
the physiology and metaphysics of sleep for a dying man, and suspicion of 
professionals.
Tracing and speculating about the overlapping layers of pain and palliation 
involved in Rachel’s improvised use of the mattress as a care practice would be 
theoretically and methodologically productive (see Harman, 2009 for a lively 
discussion of these matters). However, radical relationality with its emphasis on 
the ubiquity of relations is not necessarily sensitive to the ethical imperatives of 
total pain or to its recognition of the withdrawn, where the sources, substance 
and genealogy of painful entities can be mysterious and disjunctive, whilst 
fracturing the present. For this reason I want to draw attention to the ways in 
which the mattress as a performative act of attentiveness and care is character-
ized by an inventive use of available resources and negative capability. Rachel 
cannot verify the sources or different knots of pain that are involved in her 
patient’s situation. She does not know that the mattress will alleviate pain and 
convey her recognition of the slow losses and fears that she feels this couple are 
living through. There are no clinical trials or evidence base that she can draw 
upon. Rather, Rachel’s version of total pain is created and emerges from her 
relationship to the couple, and out of some regard for materials and affects in 
their everyday lives. Such palliative care-giving works off implicated intercon-
nections between signs and the real, it seems cognizant of how emotions can 
materialize by ‘sticking’ to certain objects (Ahmed, 2004), but it also allows 
painful entities a non-presentness or ‘dark diachronicity’ as Wyschogrod might 
call it (1990: 108).
In this necessarily abbreviated account are the basic tenets of total pain that 
at first glance seems to operate much like a flat ontology, one in which tumours 
as much as mattresses and coughs are recognized as contiguous, intra-acting 
components of pain. Yet total pain also leaves spaces for the effects of undis-
closed and unfathomable entities that can defy the most bespoke titration of 
drugs or care-full listening, so that the ‘total’ of total pain operates more as a 
provocation for care and as a tentative placeholder for a pluralized known and 
unknown.
Learning to be affected
The philosophy of total pain revitalizes social science discussions of the limits 
of understanding pain and suffering. It also raises questions of what might be 
at stake in the revisions and extensions to the empirical that I have suggested 
that total pain implies. These questions become less abstract when applied to 
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my ongoing teaching and collaboration with palliative care professionals. Con-
sider what can happen in teaching when I use case stories generated from my 
empirical research.
The case story of Maxine describes the end-of-life care of a 63-year-old 
hospice patient, a retired hospital domestic who lived alone in a council house 
(see Gunaratnam, 2004). Maxine had talked to me in some detail, and over a 
period of months, about her life with her violent ex-husband. She also recounted, 
with incongruous wit, several incidents of racist violence on the streets of South 
London in the 1960s, relatively soon after she had migrated to the UK from 
Jamaica. In the narrating of each account Maxine was more of a heroine than 
a victim. In one story of a racist attack when she was seven months pregnant, 
Maxine described giving chase to the young perpetrators who were forced to 
hide in a local shop, adding ‘Every time I pass that shop  .  .  .  I stand up and give 
a little laugh, ‘cause I remember that’s where they run.’
When Maxine was admitted into the hospice for terminal care, she grew 
increasingly agitated. She said that she felt anxious when being lifted and 
touched. Some of her nurses were overly loud, and she suspected, racist: ‘those 
girls no respect no black people’. Maxine’s nurses were not unaware of some of 
these anxieties and team members discussed the need to show sensitivity to 
Maxine’s fears and ‘paranoia’. In the last days of her life Maxine began to resist 
all routine care practices, so that her death was ‘dirty’ (Lawton, 2000).
In multidisciplinary teaching sessions we discuss what might be involved in 
Maxine’s situation. If it has not been raised, and drawing from the insights of 
feminist and psychoanalytic scholarship, I suggest how histories of gendered 
and racialized violence can be implicated in Maxine’s anxieties about her bodily 
care. In making sense of the care problematic a doctor might layer the sugges-
tions into what she has learned from 20 years of clinical practice and from evi-
dence-based research: paranoia, agitation and hyper-sensitivity to touch and to 
noise can be the consequence of drugs, biopathology, and of dying itself. A 
social worker may draw upon pedagogies of anti-oppressive practice (Dom-
inelli, 2002) and diversity training, relating the case story to his experiences of 
counselling survivors of war and women who have been raped, for whom physi-
cal care can be traumatic.
A crucial point is that the generation of these possibilities does not simply 
take place through a semiotic expansion – a piling up of new symbolic categories 
onto existing experiential and disciplinary knowledge in order to signify with 
greater accuracy, a previously unthought, but ultimately generalizable real. 
Neither is the aim to retrieve or recover to the present a lost (explanatory) object 
of pain in Maxine’s past. Rather, these interdisciplinary exchanges become 
highly focused contextualizing and specifying practices through which we can 
become variously sensitized (depending upon the nature of different sites of 
care-giving) to more qualities and registers of Maxine’s pain, including those 
that elude us. In this process, it is attentiveness to the singularities of Maxine’s 
situation that can produce shifts in the ontology of pain, so that the content of 
the experienced world expands. This process is broadly akin to what the actor 
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network theorist Bruno Latour calls ‘articulation’, a bodily practice of ‘learning 
to be affected by differences’ (2004: 210). It is a process that does not rely upon 
an object/subject, nature/culture split or upon common, uncontested episte-
mologies. For Latour, ‘The more you articulate controversies, the wider the 
world becomes’ (2004: 211).
Being affected to learn
Latour’s ‘learning to be affected’, although firmly defined as an embodied 
awareness, is relevant to thinking about methodology, ethics and the role of live 
sociological research: how might the attentiveness of live sociology be articu-
lated? There is a supplement that I would add to the consideration of this ques-
tion. In my teaching and learning with care professionals it is apparent that we 
are already affected by our encounters with pain, suffering and vulnerability. 
At the same time there are aspects of entities and others that cannot be fully 
recuperated into a taught, interdisciplinary or sensual affectedness. No matter 
how many different perspectives, experiences and levels of analysis are brought 
to the interpretation of Maxine’s case-studied life, no matter how questions of 
disciplinary knowledge production are kept in sight, there are always aspects of 
her experience that are singularly untranslatable. So whilst the content of our 
worlds have expanded through our encounters with Maxine and with each 
other, we cannot claim to fully understand the sources, routes, levels, temporal-
ity and meanings of Maxine’s pain.
And so, within learning to be affected there is also the unintelligible and the 
undecidable. It is this unintelligibility – an empirical counterpart of the with-
drawn in philosophies of total pain – that can become an inspiration or interpel-
lation to the bridging work of sociological attentiveness and the improvisations 
of methodology. In other words there are circuits or relays of inter-dependency 
between learning to be affected and being affected to learn which gain traction 
and impetus from the things we cannot resolve, recover or connect, but which 
nevertheless have a status as a response (Harrison, 2007).
‘Incomprehensibility’, Derrida writes ‘.  .  .  is not the beginning of irrational-
ism but the wound or inspiration which opens speech and then makes possible 
every logos or every rationalism’ (1978: 98). There are two notions of fidelity 
at work here: remaining faithful to the idiom and the milieu of what is unknow-
able, whilst also searching for, and using every possible means by which to know 
it differently. I am thinking here about the commonplace but often under-
described ‘wounding’ inspirations of empirical research: Bourdieu’s (1999: 622) 
struggles with the ‘infidelities’ of transcribing interviews; his admission that it 
took him over a decade (with repeated listening to an interview recording) to 
better appreciate the depth of the precarious existence of two farmers whom he 
had known personally for a long time; and my own turn to poetry and creative 
writing to evoke and convey non-linearities and enigma (Gunaratnam, 20076). 
As Graham and Thrift (2007) have also recognized despite its origins in failure 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
120
Yasmin Gunaratnam
© 2012 The Author. Editorial organisation © 2012 The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review
and fault, in improvisation there is always the hope of a provisional responsive-
ness and learning:
Improvisation allows the work of maintenance and repair to go on when things may 
seem bleak and it takes in a whole series of responses, from simple repetition (such 
as trying it again) through to attempts to improve communication so as to be clear 
exactly what the problem is, through disagreement over causes, through to complex 
theorizing, responses which are often the result of long and complex apprenticeships 
and other means of teaching  .  .  .  (2007: 4)
Of course we need to be careful about valorizing or embracing too readily, the 
unintelligible. The unknown as beyond question always risks becoming com-
plicit with the mystifications of social and political abjection (Spivak, 1988; 
Butler, 2004), or of neglecting the more mundane ways in which empirical 
inquiry can be ‘dumb’, stifled by a ‘dramatically poor repertoire of sympathies 
and antipathies’ (Latour, 2004: 219). Thinking about the status of what is inac-
cessible, mysterious or unlocatable is to think about differential histories and 
scales of existence and how these histories and scales are rendered and 
approached – and always in media res – from different, and sometimes antago-
nistic, disciplinary perspectives. But, it is also to return to basics; to recognize 
that critical methodologies, as much as care, are driven by a desire (and, for 
some, a responsibility) to oppose unnecessary suffering ‘it is precisely the radical 
destructibility of life that makes it a matter of care’ (Hagglund, 2011: 124). The 
unintelligible in this regard is not so much a bounded territory or domain, an 
empirical no-go zone. Rather, it signifies and problematizes the underlying drive 
of the attentiveness of live sociology as an imperative to uncover and to do 
something about unnecessary suffering.
Learning from the improvisations of dying migrants and care practitioners, 
I am suggesting that the unintelligible in the practice of live sociology involves 
something more than being the opposite or absence of intelligibility. Carrying 
the capacity to put into motion, touch, interrupt and halt it is the very condition 
of future ‘live’ empirical activity; a site of problem-making and accounting for 
that is simultaneously an opening to the generation of different methodological 
practices, knowledge, and ways of thinking about the usefulness of what we do 
(see Fraser, 2009) and also what is ‘sociologically unspeakable’ (Gordon, 2008: 
178). By way of conclusion there are two methodological points that are impor-
tant to me to highlight: (1) attentiveness to a range of different materials out of 
which attempts at intersubjective bridging and communication can be pro-
duced, and which exceed the social, the material and the temporally linear; and 
(2) the cultivating of an empirical sensibility that is hospitable to the inaccessible 
and the non-relational.
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Notes
1 The events and accounts in this paper come from two separate research projects (for methodologi-
cal details see Gunaratnam, 2001 and 2008b). The first, an ethnography of a London Hospice 
(1995–1999), generated Ibrahim’s and Maxine’s interviews; and the second, a study of older 
people from racialized minorities produced Mita and Rachel’s narratives (2003–2007).
2 For Derrida, thresholds always involve the unknown, and in the case of death ‘a certain pas 
[step/not]’ (Il y va d’un certain pas) (1993: 6). The plurality of meaning in the French word pas 
as ‘step’ and ‘not’ is taken to ‘mark the impossibility or impermissibility of such a step (one cannot 
or ought not cross)’ (Calarco, 2002: 19), but it is an impossibility that also serves as an incitement 
to cross the impossible/impassable.
3 In Couze Venn’s (2010: 148) discussion of the temporality and affective economy of narratives 
of spirituality, one aspect of spirituality is seen as involving ‘recognition of insufficiency or 
incompleteness’ and a waiting for unknown becomings.
4 As Sara Ahmed (2005) tells us, a lifeline involves affective and spatio-temporal orientations and 
investments, as well as being an expression of something that can save us. She notes that as much 
as a lifeline is something that is intended to save us ‘we don’t know what happens when we reach 
such a line and let ourselves live by holding on  .  .  .  We don’t know what it means to follow the 
gift of the unexpected line that gives us the chance for new direction  .  .  .’ (2005: 18).
5 Alongside those such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr and Aung San Suu Kyi, Cicely 
Saunders was the subject of a book on courage by the former British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown (2007). Of Saunders, Brown wrote ‘.  .  .  in her life she did more than anyone to come to 
terms with the greatest mystery of all: death’ (2007: 6).
6 My ongoing work with knowledge exchange has included the transformation of data into artistic 
forms, the collaborative development of information materials for dying people, involvement 
in palliative care policy development; and educational initiatives for care professionals (for 
examples see Gunaratnam, 2007).
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